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775 J- C
[Crim. No. 4791. In Bank. A1Jg. 8, 1947.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANCIS PAUL BARNES,
Appellant.
(1] Witu...-:&ed.irect EuminatioD.-ln a homicide ease where
the defense, in attempting to show that defendant's confession
was unworthy of belief because of his mental condition, questioned a peychiatrist regarding paranoid trends. and the district attorney, for the sole purpose of clarifying the witness'
meaning, was allowed to ask the witness on cross-examination
whether he found defendant sane. it was proper to sustain
objection to question on redirect examination as to the distinction between I~al insanity and merlical in!,;llnity
[t] Oriminal Law-lDstructioDS-ConfessioDB.-ln a homicide case
it was not error to refuse an instruction to the effect that the
jury should deeidt> whether deft>ndant's confession was freely
and voluntarily made. where def41ndant stipulated that no
"form of eoereion" was used by any officer of the police d..
partment on him, and thereby excused proof of the voluntarinesa of the eGnfession.
[a] Id.-Appea1-Ha.rmlesa and Reversible Error-InstructionsOonfesaiona. - In a homicide ease, in which defendant stipulated to the voluntariDesa but not the truth of his coofesaion.
the jury should have been instructed that they were the exclulive judges as to whether or not the confession was true, but
the failure to ,"ve (IIuch instruction did not prejudice defendant

[1) See Z1 OaJ..J'II1'.108.
[2] See 8 OaJ..J'II1'. 348.
Melt. Dig. References: [IJ Witnesses, § 179; [2J Criminal Law,
1816; (3] Criminal Law, 11434. [41 Homicide, 1145(2)..
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where the psychiatrists called by him to testify were Qnani.
mous in thl'ir conclusion that hl' fully knew thl' meaning of
the questions asked him and thl' meaninfl: and eft'ect of the
answertl hl' traVf!. and where many of the important elements
of thl' confP.'ltliol' WeTf' p01TOoorated b~ witnesses.
.. Homicide-Bvidence-8ulllcienq. - Thl' evidence. independ.
_tlv of defendant's confession, sustained • verdict of ll:IIilty
, of ~1JT(ler in thl' ftrst d8lll"88. where hf' was identifted by wit.
..• D8SS8I as the person near the seene ofthl' crime at the time
·01 thl' murder. where the murder weapon was traced to him.
and where he directed the police in the recovery of decedent'•

.. parse.
.

(automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa Angeles
and from an order denying a new trial. Clement
Judge. Affirmed.

''Pr<lSeCuticm for murder. Judgment imposingdea1th pen.
B. Neely, Public Defender. for Appellant.
N. Howser, Attorney General, arid Frank RichDeputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

/

.·,l·.aaYNOB, J.-Defendant was found guilty on one count
l,IIlLUl'ltier in the first degree, nine counts of robbery, seven
of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and three
of rape. The jury's verdict that defendant was guilty
:m'flll'dt!r in the first degree was without recommendation aR
Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury on
of sanity. and the trial court found him sane. This
iR an automatic one from the judgment inlposing the
penalty for murder in the first degree.
PtJ[endaltlt attacks none of the verdicts of guilty for the
charged in the amended information except that for
.Ial'dler. It is therefore unnecessary to review in detail deDnclAmt;'" conduct relating to· the other crimea.
an.ve:rendaJlt contendll that the trial court erred in ita rul•
. regarding the testimony of certain psychiatrists. He
contend" that the trial court erred in refusing to in.
the jury to determine whether certain confessions of
.~"'.da:llt were free and voluntary, and to weigh and de"mUle the effect and credibility of the confessioDII.
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The crimes with which defendant was charged were committed between the months of March and August of 1946.
During that time defendant robbed five women besides
decedent, and raped· and robbed three others.
Decedent was a dressmaker. 66 years of age, whose establishment was located in an office building in Los Angeles.
Defendant confessed to a police officer that he killed decedent.
According to this confession, defendant entered decedent's
establishment carrying gloves in his pocket and a pistol in his
waistband. He had' the "idea of holding someone up." Decedent asked him what he wanted and he replied that he
wanted a glass of water. Decedent brought him a glass of
water and after drinking it, he noticed another woman in the
room. He therefore excused himself and went outside into
the hall where he sat on the steps until he saw the other woman
leave. Then he took out his pistol and inspected it as he reentered decedent's office. When decedent saw the pistol she
became frightened and screamed; defendant, in turn, "got
kind of jittery" and the pistol went off. He started to escape
the way he entered, but someone shouted at him and he then
decided to use another exit. As he retraced his steps he
noticed decedent's purse through the open doorway. He took
the purse and ran to his automobile and then drove to an
empty lot and ransacked the purse, throwing it away after
removing the money.
The evidence shows that decedent was shot through the neck.
She must have been shot at close range, for the entrance
wound of the bullet was marked with powder burns. Two
witnesses identified defendant as the man they saw near
decedent's room shortly before and after the shot was fired.
Photographs taken of the scene after the killing reveal an
overturned glass of water near decedent's body. In addition
to the bullet wound there was a gaping wound on decedent's
scalp, a bruise over her eye, bruised knuckles on her left
hand and still another bruise on her right leg, midway
between the knee and ankle.
On August 28, 1946, defendant was stopped by a motorcycle patrol in Los· Angeles, apparently for the violation of
a traffic ordinance. As the officers approached defendant's
automobile, they observed that he had opened a door and that
some rags had fallen to the street. Defendant put the raga
back into the automobile and began searching under the seat.
He told the officers that he was looking for his driver's license.

,i
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The officers searched the automobile and found a knife buried
in the rags. Defendant was then ordered to drive his automobile to the police station while they followed. When defendant's automobile started forward, one of the officers
noticed a pistol lying on the pavement near where defendant's vehicle had stopped. He picked up the pistol and another officer followed defendant, who had meanwhile speeded
Up in an apparent attempt to elude the officers. The pursuing officer fired shots but defendant crashed his automobile against a retaining wall and escaped. He was arrested
Jater by the police.
· 1. Defendant admitted to the police that he had shot decedent.
led the police to a vacant lot where he had discarded de'_rfAT,t:'" purse after removing the cash therefrom. A ballistics
identified the pistol found near defendant's automobile
the one that had fired the bullet that killed decedent.
'At the trial, defendant's statements to the police were
admitted after his counsel examined two psychiatrists. The
of these witnesses testified that defendant had a psycho'pathic personality and "was overwhelmed by guilty feelings
:that he had in regard to the commission of his deeds. . . ."
The witness stated that defendant had a tendency toward
self-accusation and "was emotionally driven to make certain
· .Statements regardless of the possible effect they could have."
· 'He testified, however, that defendant knew the full mean"big and effect of the questions put to him and of his anThe witness found defendant to be "absolutely sincere
honest" but could "conceive of the possibility that he
BOme details that are incriminatory and that are bad
him, or stressed them in such a way that they might
_:.:'~.'" his ease worse than it would otherwise have been. I
I can conceive of this possibility; I can't say that that
happened. "
other psychiatrist also testified that defendant had a
;MJY4!mo:pathlc personality. He found that defendant "would
to be as truthful as he could to support his belief that
. should be placed under arrest because he had committed
crimes for which he believed he should be punished
'. _ • in that state of mind he was in at that time . . . he
be in a more suggestible state of mind, he would reply
.."_-w.o.,, readily or accede more readily to what would be asked
him that would tend to incriminate him!' The witness
nfused to state that defendant would add untruths to his
.,.,..· ......l l
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story; in his view defendant "probably would be more suggestible and be perfectly willing to make things a little worse
than they were provided he were asked the question in the
right way."
[1] At this point testimony was elicited from the witness
that led to a ruling by the trial court that defendant regards
as erroneous. Defendant'li counsel asked the witness if defendant exhibited paranoid trends. The witness replied that
he had. Counsel then asked, "Q. A paranoia is a form of
insanity, is it not! A. Paranoia is, yes. Q. And paranoid
trends, is that a trend towards that state of paranoia t A. No,
it is like, similar to but not identical with. That is, the term
really means like, suggested it." The defense then turnded the
witness over to the district attorney for cross-examination, and
the district attorney asked the witness if he found defendant
sane. The defense objected to this question but the district
attol'Bey, upheld by the court, contended that since the defense
had injected the subject of paranoia into the record the question was proper. The witness answered the question, stating
that defendant was not insane and knew the difference between
right and wrong. He also testified that defendant had "fully
appreciated the nature and consequences of the statements"
he had made to the witness.
Upon redirect examination, defense counsel asked the witness, "You distinguish the difference between what you said
with reference to insanity to the extent that a person doesn't
know the nature and quality of his acts from medical insanity,
based upon medical science t" This question was objected
to and the court sustained the objection.
Defendant contends that since the trial judge allowed the
district attorney to question the witness as to sanity, he should
not have sustained the objection to the foregoing question
asked on redirect examination. There is no error here. The
defense was attempting to show by means of the testimony
of psychiatrists that defendant's confession was unworthy of
belief because of his mental condition. When the defense questioned the psychiatrist regarding paranoid trends there was
no attempt to relate the questions to defendant's understanding of the meaning and effect of his statements. The result of
the defense's concluding questions was undoubtedly to leave
the jury with the impression that defendant was insane or
bordering on insanity; hence, the prosecution was justified
in clarifying the witness's meaning.

i
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, Defendant's attempt, on redirect examination, to inject the
question of the distinction between legal insanity and medical
insanity was clearly improper. There was no need to engage
in a general discussion of insanity. Defendant does not contend that he was prevented from proving that he did not
foll1 know the meaning and etfect of his confession. Nor
Was there any attempt to prevent the defense from showing
defendant's mental condition. The trial court merely put an
end to questions that would have evoked general answers not
, "pertinent to the specific issue then to be decided.
'.;,'. After the psychiatrists testified. the district attorney intro;. 'dueed a police witness who had received the confession. This
· witness was examined for the purpose of showing that the
.
was freely given. In the course of this examinahowever, counsel for the defense stipulated that "there
intention or indication of intention to intimidate," and
no "form of coercion was used by any officer of the Los
Anlre141l8 Police Department upon this defendant." and that no
"·)I'Omises were made to defendant. Finally, the defense counsel
,stated: "I want to make my position very clear in that re'Prd." The district 'attorney accepted the stipulation in lieu
.;of laying a foundation to show the free and voluntary na.'!h1re of the confession.
, ': [I] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction requested by defendant relating
·!to the confession. This instruction was to the e1fect that .the
.' Jury should decide whether the confession was freely and
'. YQluntarily made. The refused instruction further stated:
·
have the right to reconsider the question as to whether
same was voluntary or not, and in this connection you
the judges of the e1feet and value of evidence and the
~ tmlMtil)lli1ty of witnesses as the same pertains to such alleged
.·',_1~eut or confession the same as to all other evidence and
Other witneases in this case."
,The trial court's refusal to give the foregoing instruction,
'well as a similar one tendered by the prosecution, was ex'";;'_1,, based upon defendant's stipulation. Defendant eonnOlil'lH'Br. that since he was shown to have a "subnormal
B;'m.enUlL11T,y, amounting to a psychosis," he was entitled to &D
rlnflil:rn.tdinm that the confession was not binding upon the
'.' '1iu7 and that the determination of the voluntary character of
t.lie statements, as well as the determination of the weight and
· 8iedibUity to which they were entitled, were for the jury to

)
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decide. Defendant maintains that the jury was entitled to
infer "mental coercion."
Under proper instructions, the jury is ordinarily permitted
to come to an independent conclusion as to the voluntary
nature of a confession. (People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal.2d 870,
877 [151 P.2d 251].) In the present ease, however, defendant's stipulation that there was no "form of coercion" excused the district attorney from proving the voluntariness
of the confession. Such a stipulation. in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, removes from controversy the
question of coercion. State v. Harz, 78 Conn. 18 [60 A. 690];
Commcmwealth v. Desmo",d, 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 80; see 9 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., §§ 2588-2590.}
[3] The defendant's stipulation that the confession was
voluntary was not, however, a stipulation as to the truth of
the confession. The voluntariness of a confession is one thing;
the weight to be given that confession in the light of defendant's mental state is another. Experience has demonstrated
that a confession may be entirely voluntary and yet. not be
entitled to much credence. (People v. Lehew, 209 Cal. 336,
342 [87 P. 337]; People v. Elder, 55 Cal.App. 644, 648 [204
P. 29]; People v. Joyce, 233 N.Y. 61, 68 [134 N.E. 836].)
Juries are therefore usualy instructed not only to make an
independent judgment as to the voluntariness of a confe.<;'''lion,
but to decide whether or not the confession was true and mnde
with the full knowledge of its meaning and efiect. (Pcol)!e
v. Goold, 215 Cal. 763, 766 [12 P.2d 958]; People v. Lehcu',
supra, at p. 343.)
In the present ease, owing to the stipulation, there was 110
instruction relating particularly to confessions. The members
of the jury were instructed merely that they were the judges
of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight of the
evidence. It would have been better practice to instruct them
that they were the exclusive judges as to whether or not the
confession was true. In a closer ease than the present one it
is possible that the jury might view the stipulation as bearing
both upon the voluntary character of the confession and upon
its credibility. The failure of the court to give such an instruction, however, did not prejudice defendant. The psychiatrists
ealled by defendant to testify were unanimous in their conclusion that defendant fully knew the meaning of questions
asked him and the meaning and effect of the answers he gave.
Although these witnesses were of the opinion that defendant
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might be unduly subject to suggestion, the record shows that
when he confessed, he was unable to answer certain questions
and categorically denied the commission of various acts
charged by his victims. Furthermore, many of the important
elements of the confession were corroborated by witnesses.
[4] The evidence that defendant murdered decedent is
sufficient to sustain the verdict independently of his comes, sion of that crime. He was identified by two witnesses as the
person near the scene of the crime at the time of the murder.
The murder weapon was traced to him and he directed the
:. police in the recovery of decedent's purse. A complete ex·
. amination of the record reveals no error substantial enough
; to warrant a disturbance of the verdict or the judgment.
; (People v. Gonzales, supra, at p. 877.)
The judgment and the order denying defendant's mof,; tion for a new trial are donned.
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Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J .. Sc.ha.uer,

J .. and Spence, J., concurred.
N

